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ABSTRACT
Central banks typically raise short-term interest rates to defend currency pegs. Higher interest rates,
however, often lead to a credit crunch and an output contraction. We model this trade-off in an
optimizing, first-generation model in which the crisis may be delayed but is ultimately inevitable.
We show that higher interest rates may delay the crisis, but raising interest rates beyond a certain
point may actually bring forward the crisis due to the large negative output effect. The optimal
interest rate defense involves setting high interest rates (relative to the no defense case) both before
and at the moment of the crisis. Furthermore, while the crisis could be delayed even further, it is not
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The last ￿fteen years have witnessed a succession of currency crises, ranging from the EMS
crises in 1992 to similar episodes in Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999),
and Argentina (2001). Given the economic dislocations that inevitably accompany a bal-
ance of payments (BOP) crisis, the design of appropriate policies to ￿ght and prevent such
occurrences is an issue of critical importance to policymakers and academics alike. As ca-
sual evidence makes abundantly clear, the standard ￿rst line of defense against mounting
pressure on an exchange rate peg is to raise short-term interest rates. In fact, higher interest
rates to defend a peg (or, more generally, strengthen the domestic currency) are a standard
component of IMF programs, as implemented in Russia, Brazil, and most Asian countries
(Fischer, 1998). The desirability of such policies, however, has become a matter of intense
debate in the policy arena.1
The standard rationale among policymakers for raising short-term interest rates is to
make domestic-currency denominated assets more attractive (hereafter referred to as the
￿money demand e⁄ect￿ ). This should slow down (or, hopefully, stop altogether) the loss of
reserves under a pegged exchange rate. On the cost side, both proponents and detractors
essentially agree that a high interest rate policy entails mainly three type of costs: (i) a
￿scal cost in the form of a higher operational de￿cit, which results from higher interest
rates on public debt; (ii) an output cost, as high interest rates lead to a credit crunch and
an output contraction; and (iii) a further deterioration of an already weak banking system
(when applicable). The policy debate centers on the implicit assessment of the bene￿ts
versus the costs of higher interest rates, with proponents emphasizing the short-run bene￿ts
of currency stability and detractors focusing on the magnitude of the costs.
1IMF critics like Je⁄ Sachs and Joe Stiglitz, for instance, have vehemently argued against high interest
rate policies in numerous pieces in the ￿nancial press.
1For all the practical importance of this issue, there was until recently little, if any, aca-
demic work focusing explicitly on this debate. The seminal work on currency crises by
Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) ￿and most of the ensuing literature ￿gives
no role to the monetary authority in ￿ghting a potential crisis, as it implicitly assumes that
policymakers sit passively as they watch international reserves dwindle down until the ￿nal
speculative attack wipes them out completely. Only recently has an incipient theoretical
literature begun to explicitly address this topic.2 In particular, in Lahiri and VØgh (2003),
we analyze the e⁄ectiveness and optimality of raising short-term interest rates to defend a
peg by focusing on the trade-o⁄ between the money demand e⁄ect and the ￿scal cost. We
show that higher interest rates may indeed delay a BOP crisis ￿which in practice may buy
precious time for policymakers to address the fundamental imbalances. Raising interest
rates beyond a certain point, however, may actually bring the crisis forward as the ￿scal
e⁄ect begins to dominate the money demand e⁄ect. There is thus some increase in interest
rates that will maximize the delay. We also show, however, that it is not optimal to delay
the crisis as much as possible. Our analysis thus validates some of the critics￿concerns about
the perils of higher interest rates, while still o⁄ering a formal rationale for the monetary au-
thority to play an active role in defending a currency peg.3 However, our analysis in that
paper abstracts completely from output e⁄ects of higher interest rates.
2See Drazen (2003), Flood and Jeanne (2005), and Lahiri and VØgh (2003). Empirically, the evidence
on the e⁄ectiveness of higher interest rates in defending/strengthening the domestic currency is mixed (see,
for example, Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang (2001) and Kraay (2001)).
3 Flood and Jeanne (2005) also focus on the ￿scal costs of higher interest rates. Drazen (2003), on the
other hand, looks at the signalling e⁄ects of higher interest rates. Our analysis is also related to Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001a), where the government can delay the time of the crisis by further borrowing
(which implies higher interest rates in the future) but, unlike in our model, there are no bene￿ts from doing
so.
2In this paper, we focus our attention on the output costs of higher interest rates, which
is arguably the most important channel. As Figure 1 illustrates for four emerging economies
that have actively defended their currencies by raising short-term interest rates, higher in-
terest rates are typically associated with an output contraction (with vertical lines in the
￿gures denoting periods of active interest rate defense).4 Figure 2 illustrates, in turn, the
link between credit contractions and higher interest rates. The ￿gure suggests that higher
interest rates depress the economy through a credit channel.
We address the trade-o⁄ between the money demand e⁄ect and the output e⁄ect in
the context of an otherwise standard, optimizing, small open economy that is prone to
Krugman-type crises.5 To this e⁄ect, we incorporate a credit channel by assuming that
￿rms are dependent on bank credit for their productive activities, while banks need deposits
to make loans. Following Calvo and VØgh (1995), we model interest rate policy as the
monetary authority￿ s ability to set the interest rate on an interest-bearing liability (a non-
traded domestic bond). We assume that this domestic bond is held only by domestic
commercial banks. Raising the interest rate on this domestic bond increases both the lending
rate to ￿rms as well as the deposit rate paid to depositors. The latter e⁄ect increases money
demand (de￿ned as the demand for demand deposits) and may postpone the time of the
attack. The higher lending rate, however, reduces bank credit to ￿rms and, hence, extracts
an output cost by reducing employment and output.6
4The data for Figures 1 and 2 comes from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics. For detailed
evidence on the contractionary e⁄ects of currency crises, see Calvo and Reinhart (1999) and Gupta, Mishra,
and Sahay (2002).
5By a Krugman-type crisis, we mean an environment in which the central bank ￿xes the exchange rate
but follows an expansionary domestic credit policy.
6We should note that the mechanism through which an interest rate defense works in our set-up is di⁄erent
from another, more common, channel. Under our mechanism, the interest rate defense works by raising the
demand for the domestic money base. This reduces the size of the attack at the time of the crisis and thereby
3Within this model, our main question is: given the Krugman distortion (i.e., an unsus-
tainable ￿xed exchange rate), can policymakers delay the crisis by raising interest rates?
And, if so, what is the optimal interest rate defense? To answer these questions, we ￿rst
distinguish between two types of interest rate defense (both of which are announced as of
time zero): (i) a contemporaneous interest rate defense of the peg whereby the monetary
authority announces that it will raise the domestic interest rate only when the market inter-
est rate rises; and (ii) a preemptive interest rate defense of the peg whereby the monetary
authority raises the domestic interest rate before the crisis actually occurs.
We show that both the preemptive and the contemporaneous interest rate defense succeed
in delaying the crisis (at the cost of a fall in output) but only up to a certain point. Beyond
some critical level, raising interest rates further may actually bring the crisis forward. We
then show that ￿relative to the no-defense case ￿it is always optimal to announce high
interest rates both before and at the time of the crisis. Hence, it is not optimal for the central
bank to remain passive as its reserves dwindle, as implicitly assumed by ￿rst-generation
models of BOP crises. Furthermore, at an optimum, higher interest rates at the time of the
crisis would succeed in further delaying the crisis but such a policy would obviously not be
optimal.
In sum, our model provides a simple framework to think about the trade-o⁄s involved in
an active interest rate defense of a peg. It suggests that there is indeed a role for an active
postpones the attack. In the alternative view, interest rate defenses work by raising the cost of speculation
to the point where the additional cost of speculation o⁄sets the expected devaluation of the currency. In
our perfect foresight environment, there is no discrete devaluation and thus this channel does not apply. In
any event, this alternative mechanism has been critiqued on the grounds that, to be e⁄ective in deterring
speculators, interest rates must be raised to unreasonable levels. Thus, Drazen (1993) argues that ￿... even
if foreign currency assets bore no interest, an expected overnight devaluation of 0.5 percent would require
an annual interest rate over 500 percent ((1.005)365-1) x 100 = 517) to make speculation unpro￿table.￿
4interest rate defense, thus calling into question the policy relevance of models that assume
away this policy option. The presence of output costs, however, imposes clear limits to the
use of higher interest rates, which are captured in the model by the fact that the time of
the crisis is a non-monotonic function (inverted U) of the level of interest rates. While, by
necessity, the model abstracts from many other relevant channels in practice, we believe that
it captures an essential trade-o⁄ between the costs and bene￿ts of delaying a crisis.
Before proceeding further, some remarks about our modelling strategy are in order. In
any open economy set-up, allowing for an independent interest rate policy channel to co-exist
with an independent exchange rate policy involves deviating from the assumption of perfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign assets. In our model this is accomplished
by introducing a non-traded domestic bond that is held only by domestic banks, which in
turn cannot hold foreign bonds. Within this structure, if we allowed any subset of agents
to simultaneously hold both domestic and foreign bonds, the no-arbitrage condition would
immediately equalize domestic and foreign returns and hence eliminate the central bank￿ s
ability to independently set the interest rate on domestic bonds. While this assumption
seems stark, it is not as restrictive as might seem at ￿rst glance. There are alternative ways
of breaking the no-arbitrage relationship without changing the key underlying mechanism
through which an interest rate defense works in the model. Thus, as in Calvo and VØgh
(1995), we could allow households to hold these domestic bonds along with the foreign bonds
but assume that these domestic bonds provide liquidity services, i.e., one can write checks
on these holdings. Alternatively, one could allow banks to also hold foreign bonds but
introduce a costly banking technology as in Edwards and VØgh (1997) wherein banks face
a cost of managing domestic assets. Under either of these scenarios, this paper￿ s results
would carry through.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model, while Section 3 works out
5the mechanics of a BOP crisis under a passive interest rate policy. Section 4 analyzes the
e⁄ects of an active interest rate defense on output and the timing of the crisis. Section 5
derives the optimal interest rate defense of the peg. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a small open economy that is perfectly integrated with the rest of the world in
goods markets. The economy is inhabited by an in￿nitely-lived representative household
that receives utility from consuming a perishable good and disutility from supplying labor.
The world price of the good in terms of foreign currency is ￿xed and normalized to unity.
Free goods mobility across borders implies that the law of one price holds. The consumer
can also trade freely in perfectly competitive world capital markets by buying and selling an
international bond. These international bonds are denominated in terms of the good and
pay a constant r units of the good as interest at every point in time.
2.1 Households













￿￿tdt; ￿ > 0; ￿ > 0; ￿ > 1; (1)
where c denotes consumption, x is labor supply, ￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution, ￿ ￿ 1 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the real wage
(as will become evident below), and ￿(> 0) is the exogenous and constant rate of time
preference. These preferences are well-known from the work of Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Hu⁄man (1988) and have been widely used in the real business cycle literature, as they
provide a better description of consumption and the trade balance for small open economies
6than alternative speci￿cations (see, for instance, Correia, Neves, and Rebelo (1995)). In our
case, we adopt these preferences for analytical tractability since it will enable us to derive
our key results analytically.7
Households use interest-bearing demand deposits to reduce transactions costs. For sim-
plicity, we will assume that transactions costs depend only on real demand deposits (but not
on consumption). Speci￿cally, the transactions costs technology takes the standard form
st =  (ht); (2)
where s denotes the non-negative transactions costs incurred by the consumer and h denotes
real interest-bearing demand deposits. Additional real demand deposits reduce transactions
costs, but at a decreasing rate. Formally:
 (h) ￿ 0;  
0(h) ￿ 0;  
00(h) > 0;  
0(h
￿) =  (h
￿) = 0:
The assumption that  
0(h￿) = 0 for some ￿nite value of h (= h￿) ensures that the consumer
can be satiated with real money balances (i.e., the Friedman rule can be implemented). At
that point, transactions costs are assumed to be zero.
In addition to demand deposits, households can hold an internationally-traded bond (b).
Real ￿nancial wealth at time t is thus given by at = bt +ht. We denote the deposit rate by
id. No arbitrage on the internationally-traded bond implies that the nominal interest rate is
given by i = r + ", where " denotes the rate of devaluation. Hence, the opportunity cost of
holding demand deposits is Id ￿ i ￿ id (the deposit spread).8 The ￿ ow budget constraint
facing the representative household is thus given by
_ at = rat + wtxt + ￿t ￿ ct ￿ st ￿ I
d





7The key analytical simpli￿cation introduced by GHH preferences is that there is no wealth e⁄ect on
labor supply.
8It will be assumed throughout that Id ￿ 0.
7where w denotes the real wage, ￿ are lump sum transfers received from the government,
while ￿f and ￿b denote dividends received from ￿rms and banks, respectively. Integrating















t ht + st)e
￿rtdt: (4)
The household chooses paths for fct;xt;htg to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to (2)




t. The ￿rst-order conditions




￿1=￿ = ￿; (5)
￿￿x
￿￿1





where ￿ is the (time-invariant) Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (4). Equation
(5) says that the marginal utility of consumption is constant along a perfect foresight equi-
librium path. Equation (6) shows that labor supply depends positively on the real wage, w.
Finally, equation (7) implicitly de￿nes the demand for real demand deposits as a decreasing
function of their opportunity cost, Id:












The representative ￿rm￿ s production function is assumed to be linear in labor:9
yt = xt: (10)
Firms are assumed to face a ￿credit-in-advance￿constraint, in the sense that they need to
borrow from banks to pay the wage bill.10 Formally:
nt = ￿wtxt; ￿ > 0; (11)
where n denotes bank loans.11 The assumption that ￿rms must use bank credit to pay the
wage bill is needed to generate a demand for bank loans.
Firms may also hold foreign bonds, bf. Thus, the real ￿nancial wealth of the represen-




t ￿ nt. Using i‘ to denote the lending rate charged
by banks and letting I‘ ￿ i‘ ￿ i denote the lending spread, we can write the ￿ ow constraint










It is easy to see from equation (12) that wtxt￿I‘
t(= I‘
tnt) is the additional ￿nancial cost
incurred by ￿rms due to the fact that they need to borrow from banks to pay the wage bill.



















9We adopt a linear production technology purely for analytical simplicity and without loss of generality.
10Alternatively, we could assume that bank credit is an input in the production function, in which case
the derived demand for credit would be interest-rate elastic. This would considerably complicate the model
without adding any additional insights.
11Note that the credit-in-advance constraint (equation (11)) will hold as an equality only along paths
where the lending spread I‘ is strictly positive. We will assume (with no loss of generality) that if I‘ = 0,
this constraint holds with equality as well.
9The ￿rm chooses a path of x to maximize the present discounted value of dividends,
which is given by the right hand side of equation (13), taking as given a
f
0, r, and the paths
for wt and I‘
t. The ￿rst-order condition for this problem is given by
1 = wt(1 + ￿I
‘
t): (14)
Intuitively, at an optimum, the ￿rm equates the marginal productivity of labor (unity) to the




The economy is assumed to have a perfectly competitive banking sector. The representative
bank accepts deposits from consumers and lends to both ￿rms (n) and the government (z) in
the form of domestic government bonds.12 The bank charges an interest rate of i‘ to ￿rms
and earns ig on government bonds. It also holds required cash reserves, m (high powered
money). The bank pays depositors an interest rate of id. Assuming, for simplicity, that
banks￿net worth is zero, the balance sheet identity implies that mt+nt+zt = ht. As noted
in the introduction, the assumption that domestic banks do not hold foreign assets is key to
the ability of the central bank to independently set the domestic interest rate.13
12Commercial bank lending to governments is particular common in developing countries (see, for instance,
Calvo and VØgh (1995) and the references therein). Government debt is held not only as compulsory (and
remunerated) reserve requirements but also voluntarily due to the lack of pro￿table investment opportunities
in crisis-prone countries.
13Similar results would go through if we allowed banks to hold foreign bonds as long as they faced a cost of
managing domestic assets (along the lines of Edwards and VØgh (1997), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2001b), or Agenor and Aizenman (1999)). We chose the speci￿cation with no foreign borrowing because it
is analytically simpler.





t ￿ "t)nt + (i
g
t ￿ "t)zt ￿ (i
d
t ￿ "t)ht ￿ "tmt: (15)
It is assumed that the central bank imposes a reserve-requirement ratio ￿ > 0. Since required
reserves do not earn interest, at an optimum the bank will not hold any excess reserves.
Hence, we must have
mt = ￿ht: (16)
Equation (16) implies that the representative commercial bank￿ s balance sheet identity can
be written as
(1 ￿ ￿)ht = nt + zt: (17)
The representative bank maximizes pro￿ts given by equation (15) by choosing sequences of
















Since the banks do not control any of the interest rates, conditions (18) and (19) should be
interpreted as competitive equilibrium conditions. In this light, conditions (18) and (19) say
that, in equilibrium, the deposit rate(id) ￿which captures the marginal cost of deposits for
the banks ￿will be equal to the marginal revenue from an extra unit of deposits. Since the








Intuitively, loans and government bonds are perfect substitutes in the bank￿ s asset portfolio.
Since the bank can get ig by lending to the government, it must receive at least as much from
11￿rms in order to extend loans to them. Hence, in equilibrium, any change in the domestic
interest rate ig will automatically translate into a rise in the lending rate, i‘. Further, from
(19), it follows that a rise in ig will also lead to a higher deposit rate for consumers and,
hence, an increase in demand deposits.
2.4 Government
The government comprises the monetary and the ￿scal authority. For simplicity, it will
be assumed that the monetary authority issues both high powered money, m; and domestic
bonds, z. The monetary authority also pays interest on these bonds, ig, holds interest-
bearing foreign exchange reserves, f, and sets the reserve requirement ratio, ￿. The ￿scal
authority makes lump-sum transfers, ￿; to the public. We assume that these ￿scal transfers
are ￿xed and invariant over time. Hence, ￿t = ￿ ￿ for all t. The consolidated government￿ s
￿ ow budget constraint is thus given by
_ ft = rft + _ mt + _ zt + "tmt + ("t ￿ i
g
t)zt ￿ ￿ ￿: (21)
Note that the in￿ ation tax is given by "tmt in the case of high powered money (which is only
held by banks in this economy) and ("t ￿ i
g
t)zt in the case of domestic bonds.
Let d denote the stock of real domestic credit. Since the monetary authority issues
interest-bearing debt, its net domestic credit, dn, is given by d ￿ z. We assume that the







where Dn denotes net nominal domestic credit. Let E denote the nominal exchange rate,
that is, the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. From the central bank￿ s
12balance sheet, _ ft = _ mt ￿ _ dn
t , where dn = Dn=E. Further, note that _ dn
t = (￿t ￿ "t)dn
t : Using
these two facts, equation (21) can be rewritten as:
￿ ￿ = rft + (￿t ￿ "t)d
n
t + "tmt + ("t ￿ i
g
t)zt + _ zt: (23)










￿rT 4 mT; (24)
where the last term on the RHS allows for the possibility of a discrete change in real liabilities
at some time t = T.14 We also assume that the initial stock of net domestic credit and
initial real money demand are such that f0 > 0.
2.5 Equilibrium relations







Intuitively, a higher I‘ makes bank credit more expensive for ￿rms, which increases produc-
tion costs and, hence, reduces ￿rms￿demand for labor, thus lowering the real wage. We can








which shows that, at an optimum, a higher lending spread must reduce employment, x.













14Throughout the paper, we denote a discrete change in, say, variable x as ￿xT ￿ xT ￿ xT ￿. Note that
since the central bank controls net domestic credit, any discrete change in z is exactly o⁄set by a change in
gross domestic credit. Hence, only discrete changes in m enter the last term on the RHS of equation (24).
13The equilibrium amount of loans in this economy is given by (as follows from (25) and (26)













The crucial feature to note from equations (26) and (28) is that a rise in the lending spread
induces a fall in output and in bank credit. Hence, a recession in this economy is character-
ized by a rise in the lending spread which, in turn, is linked one-for-one with the domestic
interest rate, ig. Since equation (20) implies that Ig = Il for all t, one can use equation (28)
to express the demand for loans as
nt = ~ n(I
g
t ): (29)
Lastly, by combining the ￿ ow constraints for the consumer, the ￿rm, the bank, and the
government (equations (3), (12), (15) and (21)) and using equations (10), (11), and (16), we
get the economy￿ s ￿ ow resource constraint:
_ kt = rkt + xt ￿ ct ￿  (ht); (30)
where k = b + bf + f. Note that the RHS of equation (30) is simply the current account.




[xt ￿ ct ￿  (ht)]e
￿rtdt = 0: (31)
2.6 Exchange rate and interest rate policy
As in standard ￿rst-generation currency crisis models, we assume that at t = 0 the exchange
rate is ￿xed at the level ￿ E. In addition, it is assumed that there is a critical lower bound
for international reserves (say, ft = 0). It is known by all agents at t = 0 that, if and
when that critical level of reserves is reached, the central bank will cease to intervene in the
foreign exchange market and will allow the exchange rate to ￿ oat freely. As a matter of
14terminology, we will refer to the switch from the ￿xed exchange rate to the ￿ oating rate as
a ￿crisis￿ .
The key feature of our model is that, in addition to ￿xing the exchange rate, the central
bank can also set the path for the interest rate on the domestic bond, ig (referred to as
the ￿domestic￿interest rate). Importantly, setting ig implies that the central bank allows
the composition of its liabilities (non-interest bearing monetary base and interest bearing
domestic bonds) to be market determined. Alternatively, of course, the central bank could
set the composition of its liabilities and let ig be market determined. In what follows below,
we shall assume that ig is the central bank￿ s policy instrument while the composition of its
liabilities is determined endogenously. Moreover, we shall restrict attention to piecewise ￿ at
paths for ig.
As noted above, the ability of the central bank to independently set a path for the
domestic interest rate stems from our assumption that domestic bonds are held only by
domestic banks which, in turn, cannot hold any foreign bonds. Hence, di⁄erences in returns
on these two assets cannot be arbitraged away through asset trade. However, the non-
negativity restriction on the deposit spread, Id > 0, still imposes the restriction that ig < i
1￿￿.
Hence, the central bank cannot choose any arbitrarily-high level of the domestic interest
rate. It bears repeating, however, that there are alternative ways of introducing imperfect
asset substitutability which preserve the monetary authority￿ s ability to in￿ uence domestic
interest rates. Thus, introducing a liquidity service from domestic bonds (as in Calvo and
VØgh (1995) and Lahiri and VØgh (2003)) or a costly banking technology for managing
domestic assets (as in Edwards and VØgh (1997)) would also introduce an endogenous wedge
between the foreign and domestic interest rates. The e⁄ectiveness of interest rate policy then
resides in the ability of the central bank to in￿ uence the wedge by an appropriate choice of
policy. Of course, the interpretation of the wedge as well as the precise extent to which the
15policymaker can manipulate the domestic interest rate would depend on how imperfect asset
substitutability is introduced. In the case of liquid bonds, the wedge would be the liquidity
services o⁄ered by the domestic bonds while in the case of a costly banking technology the
wedge would be interpreted as the marginal cost of managing domestic assets.
Even in the context of the model presented here, it is possible to derive an interest
parity condition between the domestic interest rate (ig) and the market interest rate (i).











This condition says that, in equilibrium, the domestic interest rate must equal the mar-
ket interest rate (adjusted by reserve requirements) minus a liquidity premium (given by
￿ 0(ht)
1￿￿ > 0). As expected, the liquidity premium is a decreasing function of the stock of
demand deposits (recall that  
00 > 0). In other words, what enables the government to
set a domestic interest rate that di⁄ers from the (adjusted) market interest rate is that set-
ting the domestic interest rate e⁄ectively amounts to setting the interest rate on demand
deposits (i.e., paying interest on money). Since demand deposits provide liquidity, the re-
turn required by households to hold them will be below the market interest rate. Hence, a
higher domestic rate will be associated with a lower liquidity premium (i.e., a higher level of
demand deposits). If demand deposits o⁄ered no liquidity services (i.e.,  
0 = 0), then the
domestic interest rate could not di⁄er from the adjusted market interest rate. Importantly,
this would be true despite the non-tradability of the domestic asset.
As will become clear below, a higher rate on domestic bonds paid by the central bank
will have three e⁄ects. First, since government bonds and bank credit to ￿rms are perfect
substitutes in the banks￿portfolio, a higher interest rate on government bonds will lead
to a pari passu increase in the lending rate. This will curtail bank credit and, all else
16equal, provoke an output contraction. This e⁄ect will be referred to as the output e⁄ect of
interest rate policy.15 Second, a higher interest rate on domestic bonds will increase the debt
servicing burden of the consolidated government which we shall refer to as the ￿scal e⁄ect.16
Third, the higher interest rate on government bonds will induce banks to also pay a higher
rate on bank deposits (recall (19)). This higher rate on deposits reduces the opportunity
cost of holding bank deposits and thus increases demand for bank deposits. We will refer to
this as the money demand e⁄ect.
3 Balance of payments crises
This section ￿rst characterizes the perfect foresight equilibrium path for this economy and
then studies the case in which there is no attempt on the part of the monetary authority
to engage in an active interest rate defense. We refer to this case as ￿passive interest rate
policy￿ . It provides the natural benchmark for analyzing the e⁄ects of active interest rate
policy in later sections.
3.1 Solving the model
In what follows, we shall focus on stationary environments in which the policy-controlled





15As discussed below, it is important to note that the output e⁄ect will also be associated with an indirect
￿scal e⁄ect as commercial banks substitute out of bank lending and into government bonds, which increases
the stock of government debt and hence debt service.
16It should be noted that we could abstract from the ￿scal e⁄ect (by assuming that lump-sum government
transfers are endogenous) and that our main results regarding the government￿ s ability to delay a crisis and
optimality of an active interest rate defense would still go through (as we show in a previous version of this
paper). The ￿scal e⁄ect is needed to obtain the non-monotonicities derived below (for which both the output
and the ￿scal e⁄ects must be present).
17respectively) but may jump at that date. As is well known from Krugman (1979) and Flood
and Garber (1984), the combination of a ￿xed exchange rate and an initial ￿scal de￿cit
makes a BOP crisis inevitable in this economy. To see this, note that a ￿xed exchange rate
implies that the nominal interest rate is constant and given by it = r. From (18) and (20), it
follows that i‘ and id will also be constant. Hence, Id(= i￿id) will be constant and, in light
of (7), so will demand deposits, h. Further, since I‘ is constant, by (25), (26), and (28), so
will wt, xt, and nt. From (17), it then follows that zt will be constant. Given (16) and the
constancy of ht, mt will also be constant. Finally, since xt is constant over time, ￿rst-order
condition (5) implies that ct will be constant as well.
We now turn to the path of international reserves. Since mt and ht are constant over
time, equation (21) implies that under a ￿xed exchange rate (" = 0):
_ ft = rft ￿ i
g
0zt ￿ ￿ ￿ < 0. (33)
The assumption (which will be maintained throughout the paper) that ￿ ￿ > rf0 is a su¢ cient
condition for _ ft < 0. In other words, international reserves at the central bank will be falling
over time. Furthermore ￿and as equation (33) makes clear ￿international reserves will be
falling at an increasing rate. Since the lower bound for international reserves will be reached
in ￿nite time, the ￿xed exchange rate regime is unsustainable. The central bank will thus
be forced to abandon the peg at some point in time T and let the exchange rate ￿ oat. Fiscal
spending remains unchanged at ￿ ￿.
In order to derive the perfect foresight path for t ￿ T, notice that since reserves fall to
zero at t = T, _ ft = ft = 0 for t ￿ T, which enables us to rewrite equation (21) as
￿ ￿ = _ mt + _ zt + "tmt + ("t ￿ i
g
t)zt, t ￿ T: (34)
Taking into account (16), (17), and (19), this last equation becomes








T ￿ "t)nt ￿ _ nt, t ￿ T: (35)
18Intuitively, notice that, for a given h ￿and as follows from the banks￿balance sheet (17) ￿n
and z move in opposite direction. Hence, a ￿ ow expansion of loans to ￿rms (_ n > 0) decreases
revenues as it implies a reduction in the ￿ ow expansion of government bonds. Similarly, for
given h, a higher n implies a smaller stock of bonds which reduces the real debt service.
Time-di⁄erentiating equations (7) and (28), using (8) and (29), and substituting the
results into (35) yields an equilibrium di⁄erential equation in " for t ￿ T:
_ "t = ￿
h




t ) + (i
g
T ￿ "t) ~ n(I
g





￿~ n0 + 1
 00
￿￿1
> 0. (Recall that i = r + ", Id = r + " ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)ig, and




It is easy to check that, in a local neighborhood of the steady state, equation (36) is










n > 0, where
￿h ￿ ￿~ h0Id=h is the opportunity-cost elasticity of demand deposits, and ￿n ￿ ￿~ n0Ig=n is
the interest elasticity of loans by ￿rms (in general equilibrium).17



















n is the e⁄ect of a change in " on net govern-
ment revenues. If both elasticities are less than unity, then a rise in " increases in￿ ation
tax revenues from deposits (￿rst term) and, for given h, increases the real debt service (sec-
ond term) since an increase in " reduces Ig. If this overall expression is positive, then
equation (36) is unstable around the steady state. Hence, to ensure a unique convergent
17To simplify the derivation of some results below, we will assume that ￿h is a strictly increasing function
of the opportunity cost of holding deposits Id. This property is satis￿ed by, among others, Cagan money
demands, which provide the best ￿t for developing countries (see Easterly, Mauro, Schmidt-Hebbel (1995)).











It follows then that for t ￿ T ￿and along any perfect foresight equilibrium path with
constant ￿ ￿ and ig ￿"t = "T. A constant " and ig imply that i, Id and Ig must all be constant
over time. As above, this implies, by (5), (16), (17), (25), (26), and (28), that c, x, h, n, m;
and z all remain constant as well. Lastly, the constancy of h implies that money demand
is constant over time. Since dn = ￿h for all t ￿ T, this implies that _ dn
t = 0 and ￿t = "T for
all t ￿ T.





h re￿ ects the
well-known possibility of a La⁄er curve relationship between revenues from money printing
and the opportunity cost of holding money. As is standard, and to ensure that the economy






In order to tie down the equilibrium post-collapse values of all the endogenous variables,
we need to determine the values of Id
T and "T as functions of the post-collapse policy variables
i
g
T and ￿ ￿. We can totally di⁄erentiate (37) to implicitly solve for Id









































T < 0 for low values of I
g
T but @~ Id
@I
g
T > 0 for all I
g




T = ~ Id(I
g
T;￿ ￿) into the bank￿ s ￿rst-order condition (19), we can also solve
for the stationary depreciation rate "T as an implicit function of I
g
T, for a given ￿ ￿, i.e.,
18It is easy to establish numerically ￿using Cagan money demand functions ￿the existence of the case in
which I
g
T > ^ I
g
T.





































The sign of this expression is, in general, ambiguous.
Lastly, we can substitute ~ "(I
g




T￿r￿"T to implicitly solve for I
g






































The sign of this expression follows directly from our assumption 1 > Id￿r











n > 0. The key feature to note from equation (40)
is that I
g
T is monotonically increasing in i
g
T. Hence, each i
g
T maps into a unique I
g
T.





r; 0 ￿ t < T;
r + ~ "(I
g
T;￿ ￿); t ￿ T:
(41)











0 ￿ r; 0 ￿ t < T;
i
g
T ￿ r ￿ ~ "(I
g








￿r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I
g
0; 0 ￿ t < T;
￿ [r + ~ "(I
g
T;￿ ￿)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I
g
T; t ￿ T:
(43)
To tie down the time of the crisis it is useful to note that the path for the nominal
exchange rate must be continuous, i.e., E cannot jump at T. Letting T ￿ denote the instant
before the run, the discrete change in central bank liabilities at the moment of the crisis T
is given by ￿mT ￿ ￿(hT ￿ h0), which corresponds to the loss in international reserves since
21￿fT = ￿mT:19 In what follows, we de￿ne the size of the loss in reserves as ST ￿ m0 ￿ mT.
Thus, by de￿nition, ST = ￿￿mT. Using equation (24) ￿and taking into account that for
t > T, ￿ ￿ = "TmT + ("T ￿ i
g






￿ ￿ + i
g
0z0 ￿ rST





3.2 Passive interest rate policy: The Krugman case
We have purposely set up our model so that it reduces to a standard Krugman model (with
an endogenous labor supply) for the case in which policymakers set the domestic interest




T = 0. In this case,
the banking sector plays no role and the model delivers the standard results that would arise
in a model with no banks and a standard labor-leisure choice. We refer to this case as the
￿passive interest rate policy￿case since policymakers choose not to use their ability to engage
in an active interest rate defense (which would require setting the domestic interest rate, ig,




T = 0 implies, by (20), that I‘
0 = I‘
T = 0 so
that ￿rms do not face a premium for having to resort to bank credit.
The following proposition summarizes the results for this Krugman case:




T = 0 and assume that ￿ ￿ > r
h
~ n(0) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)~ h(￿r)
i
: Then, at
the time of the crisis (T), the deposit spread Id rises, but consumption and output remain
unchanged.
Proof. From (20), it follows that I‘
0 = I‘
T = 0. Hence, from equations (26) and (28), neither
n nor x change at T. The fact that Id must rise at T follows directly from equation (43) and
the assumption that ￿ ￿ > r
h
~ n(0) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)~ h(￿r)
i
. This assumption, when combined with
19Note that at time T real net domestic credit dn remains unchanged since both Dn and E are predeter-
mined. Hence, any change in the money base m(= ￿h) is accompanied by an exactly o⁄setting change in
reserves (f).
22equation (37), implies that ~ "(0;￿ ￿) > 0. Since Id rises, equation (8) implies that h falls at T.
To see that consumption must remain unchanged at T, note that equation (5) implies that
(c0 ￿ ￿x￿
0)
￿1=￿ = (cT ￿ ￿x￿
T)
￿1=￿ (recall that, along a perfect foresight path, the multiplier ￿
remains unchanged). Hence, c0 ￿ cT = ￿ (x￿
0 ￿ x￿
T). Since x0 = xT, it follows immediately
that c0 = cT.
Proposition 1 shows that at the time of the crisis there is a run out of deposits (and,
hence, out of the monetary base, as banks hold cash reserves against deposits). The rise in
the deposit spread, Id, at the time of the crisis reduces the demand for deposits. The fall in
deposits reduces the loanable funds available to the banks. Since the lending spread, I‘, is
unchanged, the demand for loans by ￿rms remains unchanged as well. Given that domestic
bonds and loans to ￿rms are perfect substitutes in the commercial banks￿asset portfolio, the
banks adjust to the lower supply of loanable funds by reducing their holdings of domestic
bonds while keeping private lending unchanged. Naturally, these are the same results that
would obtain if there were no banking system in the model and households directly held the
monetary base.20
4 Active interest rate defense
We now turn to the central focus of the paper; namely, the e⁄ects of an active interest rate
defense of the peg. By ￿active￿ , we mean deviating from a passive interest rate policy by
setting the domestic interest rate (ig) above the market interest rate (i), which implies setting
20Notice that the result that output and consumption remain unchanged at T follows from our assumption
that the transactions technology is independent of consumption. If this were not the case, it is easy to show
that the rise in Id at T would lead to lower consumption and lower output. By abstracting from this e⁄ect
(which we do not need for our results to go through), we ensure that all output e⁄ects studied below are the
result of an active interest rate defense of the peg.
23a positive Ig. (Recall that a passive interest rate policy corresponds to setting I
g
t = 0:) We
allow the monetary authority to set a piece-wise ￿ at path for i
g





T, but not necessarily at the same level). Denoting a passive domestic interest rate by ig(p),







r; 0 ￿ t < T;
r + ~ "(0;￿ ￿) t ￿ T:
(45)
We consider two types of interest rate defense policies. The ￿rst policy ￿referred to as
a contemporaneous interest rate defense ￿entails raising i
g
T above the passive level of i
g
T(p)
(for a given i
g
0). Note that this amounts to setting a positive I
g
T. In this case, the domestic
interest rate is raised at the time of the crisis (although the policy is announced at time 0).





0(p) (for a given i
g
T). In this case, the domestic interest rate is raised before the crisis
takes place.21
4.1 Contemporaneous interest rate defense
We start by investigating the e⁄ects of raising i
g
T above the passive level i
g
T(p). The following
proposition summarizes the two key e⁄ects:
Proposition 2 The time of the crisis (T) is a non-monotonic function of the post-collapse
domestic interest rate i
g




T(p) the crisis is
delayed relative to the Krugman case. However, further interest rate increases beyond a
threshold level ^ {
g
T bring the crisis forward. Furthermore, the higher is i
g
T, the lower is the
post-collapse level of output.





















24Proof. From (20), we know that I‘ = Ig. Hence, from (26), (28) and (40), it follows that
both xT (and thus output) and nT are decreasing functions of i
g
T. This establishes the last
part of the proposition. To prove the non-monotonicity of T in i
g
T, di⁄erentiate equation












































where we have used equations (8) and (38). The ￿rst term on the right hand side (RHS)

















T Q ￿(1￿￿r). Hence, since 1 < ￿(1￿￿r), then @T
@ig > 0 for low values of ig but @T
@Ig < 0
for all Ig > (￿(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ 1)=￿ ￿ ^ Ig. Now de￿ne ^ {g such that ^ Ig = ~ Ig(^ {g;￿ ￿). The proof of
the non-monotonicity of T in i
g
T then follows directly from the fact that @~ Ig=@i
g
T > 0.
We have thus shown that by merely announcing at time 0 that domestic interest rates will
be raised by more than any increase in the market interest rate, the monetary authority can
potentially delay the crisis relative to the Krugman case (i.e., passive interest rate policy).
In practice, this ability to postpone the crisis may make all the di⁄erence since it gives time
to the ￿scal authority to put its house in order and therefore prevent the crisis altogether.
But this works only up to a point. Beyond a threshold level of the domestic interest rate,
any further interest rate hike only succeeds in bringing the crisis forward instead of delaying
it.

















where we have used the fact that m = ￿h. Hence, any increase in the post-collapse demand
for money (or ￿hT) will, ceteris paribus, postpone the crisis while any decrease in hT has
the opposite e⁄ect. Intuitively, for a given path of reserves pre-collapse, an increase in
25the post-collapse money demand reduces the size of the attack and, thereby, postpones the
time of the attack. The opposite occurs in the event of a decrease in hT. Recall that
the opportunity cost of demand deposits is Id ￿ r + " ￿ id. A rise in ig, in and of itself,
increases the deposit rate, id ￿recall that id = (1 ￿ ￿)ig ￿and therefore tends to reduce Id
and increase the demand for hT (the money demand e⁄ect). A rising ig, however, tends
to increase the post-collapse in￿ ation rate (and hence Id) for two reasons. First ￿and as
discussed earlier ￿there is a direct ￿scal e⁄ect since the rise in ig increases the debt service.
Second, there is an indirect ￿scal e⁄ect (associated with the output e⁄ect) as a rising ig also
raises Ig, which in turn induces a fall in bank credit to ￿rms, n. This e⁄ect tends to reduce
￿scal revenues because the counterpart of a falling n is an increase in z (i.e., an increase in
liabilities of the central bank held by commercial banks), which increases the government￿ s
debt service. In order to ￿nance this fall in revenues, the post-collapse in￿ ation rate (i.e.,
the rate of depreciation) must increase. These two e⁄ects tend to increase Id. For all
ig > ^ {g, these two e⁄ects dominate and further increases in ig actually raise Id.
The negative output e⁄ect of a higher i
g
T results from the higher lending spread induced
by a higher domestic interest rate. The higher lending spread increases the e⁄ective real
wage, which lowers demand for labor (and hence output) and leads to a lower demand for
bank credit. This induces banks to substitute out of loans and into bonds.
4.2 Preemptive interest rate defense
We now turn to the e⁄ects of a preemptive interest rate defense whereby the pre-crisis
interest rate is set at a high level (relative to the passive case). Speci￿cally, we investigate




0(p). Note that this corresponds to a temporary
increase in interest rates at date t = 0 which is expected to last till date T. Interest rates
are expected to revert back to the passive level i
g
T(p) at time t ￿ T. Hence, we continue to
26maintain I
g
T(p) = 0. The following proposition summarizes the main results:
Proposition 3 The time of the crisis is potentially a non-monotonic function of the pre-
collapse interest rate i
g
0. Thus, for all i
g
0 ￿ ^ {g the time of the crisis is unambiguously
decreasing in i
g




0(p), the crisis may be postponed.
The pre-crisis demand for real demand deposits is monotonically increasing while the pre-
crisis output is monotonically decreasing in i
g
0.





0 ￿r. Hence, from (26), it follows that x0 (and
thus output) is decreasing in i
g
0. From (43), it is easy to see that Id
0 is lower than in the
Krugman case (since I
g
0 is higher), and therefore real demand for deposits is higher. This
establishes the last part of the proposition.
Using the commercial bank balance sheet relation z = (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ n, we can di⁄erentiate















￿ ￿ + i
g
0z0 ￿ rf0



























n0 S 0. Denoting the instant
before the attack by T ￿, note that ST ￿ f0 = fT￿ ￿ f0 < 0 since reserves are secularly
declining over time.22 Moreover,
@h0
@Id








Ig ￿n(Ig) as Ig S ^ Ig ￿ (￿(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ 1)=￿, it follows that ￿ > 0 for all i
g
0 ￿ ^ {g ￿ ^ Ig +r





0). For ￿ < 0 however, the sign of @T
@i
g
0 is ambiguous. Figure 3 provides











0 < 0 for all i
g
0 beyond a threshold point.23
22Since international reserves go to zero at T, the size of the run at T is ST = fT ￿.
23The key parameter values for the numerical example in Figure 3 are as follows: i
g
T = 0:25, ￿ = 0:009,
r = 0:1, and ￿ = 0:99. The vertical axis meaures percentage deviations from the passive interest rate case.
27As before, the negative output e⁄ects of a higher i
g
0 is due to the higher lending spread
induced by higher domestic interest rates. At the same time, since the opportunity cost of
holding demand deposits falls as i
g
0 increases, demand for real demand deposits goes up.
To understand the e⁄ect of i
g
0 on the time of the attack, note that from equation (44)
the initial domestic interest rate a⁄ects T through two channels. First, it a⁄ects T through
the e⁄ect on the size of the attack ST = m0 ￿ mT. Since m0 = ￿h0 is monotonically rising
in i
g
0, the size of the attack is increasing in i
g
0. Given a path for reserves, a bigger attack at
T implies that the attack must happen sooner since the cuto⁄level for reserves at which the
run wipes out remaining reserves is reached sooner. This negative e⁄ect on T is captured




However, there is a second e⁄ect of i
g
0 on T which comes through the e⁄ect on i
g
0z0. It






0 ￿ ￿. Note that during the ￿xed exchange rate period, the ￿scal
de￿cit is ￿nanced through the loss of international reserves. Since the initial ￿scal de￿cit
is ￿ ￿ + i
g
0z0 ￿ rf0, ￿ > 0 implies that the initial de￿cit rises with i
g
0 which, in turn, implies
that reserves decline at a faster rate. Hence, for a given ST the cuto⁄ level of reserves is
reached faster and the crisis happens earlier. Thus, when ￿ > 0 both e⁄ects tend to bring
the crisis forward and @T
@i
g
0 is unambiguously negative. For ￿ < 0 however, the initial de￿cit
declines as i
g
0 rises. Hence, reserves decline at a slower rate which implies that, for a given
ST, the attack must happen later. In this case the ￿scal e⁄ect and the size of the run e⁄ect
go in opposite directions. Whether the crisis is postponed or brought forward through an
increase in i
g
0 depends on the net e⁄ect. Figure 3 shows the existence of cases where the
￿scal e⁄ect can dominate and the attack can be postponed for small increases in i
g
0.
(As should be obvious, this is just a numerical example and there is no attempt at replicating any particular
economy.)
285 Optimal interest rate defense
The previous analysis makes clear that while raising interest rates can successfully delay a
crisis (up to a point), this bene￿cial e⁄ect comes at the cost of a fall in output. The obvious
question then arises: given the preexisting distortion of an initial budget de￿cit which is
inconsistent with a ￿xed exchange rate, what is the optimal interest rate defense of the peg?
To answer this question, notice that since the paths of consumption and labor may change

















Given that the multiplier ￿ is constant along any perfect foresight path, ￿rst-order condition
(5) implies that c0 ￿ ￿x￿
0 = cT ￿ ￿x￿












+ [xT ￿ ￿x
￿










T, welfare is maximized by







L = [x0 ￿ ￿x
￿




+ [xT ￿ ￿x
￿
T ￿  (hT)]e
￿rT; (49)
where x0 = ~ x(I
g
0); xT = ~ x(I
g




T); h0 = ~ h(Id
0); hT = ~ h(Id
T); Id




T = ￿iT ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)I
g
T; as follows from (8), (26), (43), and (44). The non-negativity
restrictions on Id
0 and Id
T require imposing the constraint i
g
0 ￿ r
1￿￿ and the restriction that
￿ ￿ >
￿
^ Id ￿ r
￿
~ h(^ Id) + (^ Ig + r)~ n(^ Ig) where ^ Id = ~ Id(^ Ig;￿ ￿) which implies that Id
T = 0 is not
feasible in this economy. Recall that from equation (38) @~ Id
@I
g
T S 0as i
g
T S ^ {g and that
29^ Ig = ~ Ig(^ {g;￿ ￿) ￿ (￿(1 ￿ ￿r) ￿ 1)=￿. Hence, this last condition implies that level of ￿scal
transfers are so high that the lowest possible value for Id
T is positive.























































































where ￿ ￿ x0 ￿ ￿x￿
0 ￿  (h0) ￿ [xT ￿ ￿x￿
T ￿  (hT)] and where we have used the ￿rst-order
conditions for money demand and labor.
To focus on the intuition, consider for a moment interior solutions (i.e., think of (50) and
(51) as holding with equality). At an optimum, the government equates the marginal costs




T. What are the marginal costs and bene￿ts of increasing
i
g
0 (i.e., preemptive interest rate defense)? The two terms on the RHS of (50) capture the
marginal cost and marginal bene￿t of raising i
g
0. Consider the ￿rst term within the square
brackets. A higher i
g
0 leads to a higher lending spread (a higher I‘
0). This, in turn, increases
the e⁄ective real wage and thus reduces labor. Lower labor implies less output (a negative
e⁄ect) but less disutility from labor (a positive e⁄ect). The second (non-negative) term
in the square brackets in (50) captures one bene￿t of raising i
g
0. A higher i
g
0 reduces the
opportunity cost of holding demand deposits (Id
0), thus increasing real demand for deposits
and reducing transactions costs. The last term on the RHS re￿ ects a second potential
bene￿t of raising i
g









then the good times are prolonged which is welfare improving. The trade-o⁄s induced by a
contemporaneous interest rate defense as captured by equation (51) are exactly analogous.24
24 Notice that the bene￿t from delaying a crisis that is derived through an extension of the good times
30Having described the trade-o⁄s implied by an interest rate defense, we now characterize
the key features of the optimal interest rate policy.
Proposition 4 Consider a perfect foresight equilibrium path for a given path of ￿scal spend-
ing, i.e., ￿t = ￿ ￿ and an initial ￿scal de￿cit, i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿ rf0 > 0. Given such a path and the
announced exchange rate policy, it is always optimal, starting from the passive interest rate






























T = 0. It is
easy to see that evaluating equation (51) around I
g



































T T 0 as I
g
T S ^ Ig > 0. Similarly, evaluating equation
(50) around I
g


















0 ￿ 0 which is the su¢ cient condition stated





























T=^ {g = 0.
Proposition 4 says that the optimal pre and post-crisis domestic interest rates are higher
than the passive interest rate policy implied by the Krugman case. Hence, it is optimal to
engage in some active interest rate defense. Furthermore, at an optimum for the contem-
poraneous interest rate policy, it is feasible to delay the crisis further but not optimal to do
so.25
applies only if ￿ > 0. Otherwise, it re￿ ects a welfare cost. The sign of ￿ is, in general, ambiguous and
depends on parameters and the optimal policy.
25It should be noted that in these Krugman-type ￿rst-generation currency crisis models where BOP crises
occur due to an unsustainable ￿scal stance, the globally optimal policy is to let the exchange rate collapse
at time 0 itself, i.e., go to a ￿ exible exchange rate right away. This is true in our model as well. Hence, in
Proposition 4 we describe the ￿constrained￿optimal interest rate policy which is contingent on the announced
exchange rate policy and ￿scal path. In a related paper, Rebelo and VØgh (2002) provide a rationale for
delaying the collapse of an exchange rate peg in these ￿rst-generation models by introducing various costs
31Intuitively, around the point I
g
T = 0, there is a ￿rst-order welfare gain in terms of reducing
transaction costs and postponing the crisis but no ￿rst-order output loss. The trade-o⁄s
involved for the optimal preemptive interest rate defense are similar. The presence of
the su¢ ciency condition for the preemptive case but not for the contemporaneous case
simply re￿ ects the fact that under our parameter assumptions the time of the crisis is always
increasing in i
g




T(p). However, the absence of
a corresponding parameter restriction for the preemptive interest rate policy implies that it









0(p) > 0, a falling T implies that a preemptive interest rate defense shortens the good
times and therefore reduces welfare. We should, however, stress that this condition is only
su¢ cient and not necessary for the optimality of engaging in some preemptive interest rate
defense.
The last part of the proposition also shows that the contemporaneous interest rate policy
that maximizes the delay of the balance of payments crisis is not optimal. In particular,
the proposition shows that at the point of maximum delay, the policymaker would do better
by reducing i
g
T a little and thereby allowing the crisis to happen sooner. Intuitively, at the
point of maximum delay, a marginal reduction in i
g
T has only second order e⁄ects on the
post-collapse demand for deposits (and hence transactions costs and the time of the attack).
On the other hand, the reduction in the interest rate reduces the domestic lending spread
which has ￿rst-order e⁄ects on loans and output. Hence, it is not optimal to raise i
g
T all the
way to ^ {g, which is the point where the delay is maximized.
associated with abandoning the peg.
326 Conclusions
The increasing frequency of BOP crises in disparate parts of the world raises the issue of
what is the appropriate policy response to such episodes. In this paper we have looked at
an often-used tool to ￿ght o⁄ speculative attacks ￿higher interest rates. Higher interest
rates typically work by increasing the demand for domestic currency assets ￿the money
demand e⁄ect. They carry, however, some adverse side-e⁄ects. In particular, policymakers
are often concerned about the output consequences of an aggressive interest rate defense of
an exchange rate peg.
In this paper we have studied a model in which, by increasing the demand for interest-
bearing deposits, higher interest rates have a positive money demand e⁄ect, but also extract
an output cost by making bank credit more expensive. We have shown that the time of
the crisis may be a non-monotonic function of interest rates, which implies that there is
some rise in interest rates (both before and at the time of crisis) that maximizes the delay.
Furthermore, an optimal interest rate defense involves announcing high interest rates both
before and at the time of the crisis. Hence, it is always optimal to engage in some active
interest rate defense, contrary to the implicit assumption in most of the literature based on
Krugman (1979). In conjunction with our previous work (Lahiri and VØgh (2003)), where
we abstracted from output costs and focused solely on ￿scal costs, the results of this paper
suggest cause for extreme caution and restraint in the use of higher interest rates as an
instrument for defending exchange rate pegs.
As is true with any model, ours simpli￿es a much more complex reality, in which other
mechanisms surely come into play. But it is precisely the complex nature of the real world
which, in our view, makes it even more valuable to go back to basics and develop simple
models that will hopefully capture some essential trade-o⁄s and provide some guidance to
33our thinking. As we view the world, there are three key aspects of reality which are not
directly captured in our model. First, policymakers use higher interest rates mainly to buy
time to put the ￿scal house in order. This feature could be captured by assuming that
the ￿scal fundamentals follow some stochastic process whereby, at each point time, there is
some exogenous probability that the ￿scal situation will be resolved. This would increase
the bene￿ts of postponing the crisis without altering the essential mechanisms. Second,
currency crises can lead to a banking crisis, which in turn can worsen the output contrac-
tion. This feature could be incorporated along the lines of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2001b). Finally, we should mention that our framework abstracts from ￿signalling￿
considerations (i.e., higher interest rates may convey information about policymakers￿ability
and/or commitment to defend a peg), which are the focus of Drazen (2003). Since address-
ing these signalling considerations naturally requires a di⁄erent theoretical framework, we
view Drazen￿ s analysis as complementing ours.
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